Abstract: David Chalmers (2011) uses Bayesian theories of credence to argue against referentialism about belief. This paper argues that Chalmers's Bayesian objections to referentialism are very similar to older, more familiar objections to referentialism. There are familiar responses to the old objections, and there is a predictable way to modify those old responses to meet Chalmers's Bayesian objections. The new responses to the new objections are no less plausible than the old responses to the old objections. Chalmers's positive theory of belief and credence is structurally similar to typical referential theories of those objects, but his theory is more speculative and dubious.
propositions. Another is the view that the objects of belief are sets of metaphysically possible worlds. Chalmers's main argument against referentialism (outlined on p. 588) appeals to Bayesian theories of credence. Chalmers says that Bayesianism is true, and places certain constraints on the objects of credence. Referential propositions do not satisfy those constraints, and so are not the objects of credence. But credences are degrees of belief, and so the objects of credence are also the objects of belief. Thus, Chalmers concludes, the objects of belief are not referential, and so referentialism about belief is false. Chalmers then goes on to present a positive theory of the objects of belief and credence.
In this paper, I argue that Chalmers's Bayesian objections to referentialism are very similar to older, more familiar objections to referentialism. There are familiar responses to the old objections, and there is a predictable way to modify those old responses to meet Chalmers's Bayesian objections. The new responses to the new objections are no less plausible than the old responses to the old objections. Thus, Chalmers's Bayesian objections to referentialist theories present virtually the same issues as the old objections. Moreover, Chalmers's positive theory of the objects of credence and belief is structurally similar to typical referential theories, but his theory has problems that referential theories do not. 
Russellianism and rational belief
I shall concentrate almost entirely on defending one particular form of referentialism from Chalmers's objections, namely a version of Russellianism. Russellianism says that the objects of belief, and the semantic contents of declarative sentences, are Russellian propositions. Russellian Suppose that Jekyll is identical with Hyde, and suppose that dreadfulitis is a dreadful congenital disease. According to Russellianism, sentences (1) and (2) semantically express the same proposition.
(1) Jekyll has dreadfulitis.
(2) Hyde has dreadfulitis.
Therefore, if Russellianism is true, then (3) and (4) semantically express the same proposition.
(3) Olivia believes that Jekyll has dreadfulitis.
(4) Olivia believes that Hyde has dreadfulitis.
If (3) and (4) express the same proposition, then they (necessarily) have the same truth value. Yet (the objection goes), Olivia may understand and vigorously assent to (1), while understanding and vigorously dissenting from (2). If she does, then (3) is true and (4) is false. So, Russellianism is false. Call this version of Frege's puzzle the Substitution Objection. We could reasonably say that the Substitution Objection is a semantic objection, for it relies on intuitions about the truth values of (3) and (4).
But other familiar arguments against Russellianism rely heavily on premises about rational belief. Suppose Olivia vigorously assents to (1) and the negation of (2), namely 'Hyde does not have dreadfulitis'. Then (5) and (6) are both true.
(5) Olivia believes that Jekyll has dreadfulitis.
(6) Olivia believes that Hyde does not have dreadfulitis.
But if Russellianism is true, then the proposition that Hyde does not have dreadfulitis is the negation of the proposition that Jekyll has dreadfulitis. So if Russellianism is true, then Olivia believes a proposition and its negation. But Olivia is rational, and no rational agent believes a proposition and its negation (call this last claim the No Rational Belief in Contradictions
Principle.) 3 Therefore, the objection concludes, Russellianism is false. Unlike the previous objection, this one makes an ineliminable appeal to a principle about rational belief. Call it the
No Rational Belief in Contradictions Objection.
Another kind of familiar objection relies on claims about updating beliefs. For example, Kripke's Pierre (Kripke 1979) assents to 'Si New York est jolie, Londres est jolie aussi' and later assents to 'London is not pretty'. Kripke points out that Pierre may rationally fail to conclude that New York is not pretty. We can construct a similar example using Olivia. Imagine that at time t, Olivia assents to (7).
If Jekyll has the alpha gene and Jekyll has the beta gene, then Jekyll has dreadfulitis.
At a later time t′, she assents to (8), while continuing to assent to (7).
(8) Jekyll has the alpha gene and Hyde has the beta gene.
Nevertheless, she dissents from (1), 'Jekyll has dreadfulitis', at t′. (Let us further assume that she either dissents from, or remains agnostic about, all sentences that attribute dreadfulitis to Jekyll/Hyde.) All of this seems consistent with Olivia's being rational. But if Russellianism is true, and Olivia assents to both (7) and (8), then (9) and (10) are true.
(9) Olivia believes that Jekyll has the alpha gene and Jekyll has the beta gene.
(10) Olivia believes that if Jekyll has the alpha gene and Jekyll has the beta gene, then
Jekyll has dreadfulitis. and its negation (while taking 'Jekyll' to name the same person both times). Then surely he does violate some principle of rational belief. Suppose Oliver also assents to conditional (8) and to its antecedent, but nonetheless fails to assent to its consequent, 'Jekyll has dreadfulitis'. Then Oliver is in some way irrational.
To explain why Olivia is rational and Oliver is not, many Russellians maintain that belief is a mediated binary relation, in which the mediators are propositional guises (or ways of taking 4 The Modus Ponens Principle, like the No Rational Belief in Contradictions Principle, is too strong, for a rational person who believes a conditional proposition and its antecedent may fail to believe its consequent and fail to reject the conditional or antecedent, simply because he has not considered all of the propositions at the same time. But I will ignore these sorts of qualifications to the principle, as they are irrelevant to typical Russellian responses to the Modus Ponens Objection.
propositional-negation of the proposition that he formerly asserted, using a sentence that is the sentential-negation of the sentence that he formerly uttered. He also believes the propositionalnegation of the proposition that he formerly believed, under a guise that is the guise-negation of the former guise. For every guise, there is exactly one guise that is its guise-negation. More precisely:
If Guise(x, P, A), then there is exactly one guise y such that (i) y is the guise-negation of x, and (ii) Guise(y, not-P, A).
Let us use 'Neg(x)' for the guise-negation of guise x. Similarly, for any pair of guises x and y (in that order), there is a guise-material-conditionalization of them, Cond(x, y), a guise-conjunction of them, Conj(x, y), and a guise-disjunction of them, Disj(x, y). 
No Contradictory Guises Principle
No rational agent A is such that BEL (A, P, x) and BEL(A, not-P, Neg(x)).
Guise Modus Ponens Principle
If A is a rational agent, and BEL (A, if P then Q, Cond(x, y) ) and it comes to be the case that BEL (A, P, x) , then it will come to be the case that either (a) BEL(A, Q, y) or (b) it is not the case that BEL (A, P, x) or (c) it is not the case that BEL (A, if P then Q, Cond(x, y) ).
Generally speaking, rationality of belief is determined by rationality of BELing. A person rationally believes a proposition iff there is a guise under which she rationally BELs that proposition.
Rational Believing and BELing
Agent A rationally believes proposition P iff x(Guise(x, P, A) & Rationally BEL (A, P, x) ).
Let us use 'Guise Russellianism' to refer to the view that combines Russellianism with these claims about rationality and guises.
According to Guise Russellianism, belief is a binary relation, and the objects of belief (the things that agents believe) are propositions, yet one must mention guises to explain agents' rational belief in propositions. This may be surprising, but perhaps the following analogy will make it less so. Assertion is a binary relation between agents and propositions. But I can loudly assert that Obama is the President (by speaking) while also simultaneously silently asserting that Obama is the President (by e-mail). I can do this because assertion is a binary relation that is mediated by utterances, and an agent's sonic relations to propositions are determined by the sonic properties of those mediators. Analogous points hold for belief: it is a binary relation between agents and propositions, but whether an agent rationally believes a proposition depends on the properties of the mediators of belief.
You might wonder what these guises are. All Russellians would say that they are the things that play the above-described roles. Some would say no more than this. Russellians who say more differ among themselves about the nature of guises. A few might say that they are natural language sentences or the linguistic meanings (Kaplanian characters) of such sentences.
But most would deny this because of Paderewski cases and John-Perry-type cases (Perry 1977 (Perry , 1979 . Some Russellians would hold that guises are (intrinsic) mental states. Quite a few would hold that guises are mental representations, such as formulas in a language of thought, which are involved in intrinsic mental states of the previous sort (Crimmins and Perry 1989 , Richard 1990 , Crimmins 1992 , Braun 1998 .
Russellians also typically appeal to guises to respond to the earlier semantic objections. A rational person may assent to (1) and fail to assent to (2) because she BELs that Jekyll has dreadfulitis under a guise she associates with 'Jekyll has dreadfulitis', but she fails to BEL that Jekyll has dreadfulitis under the guise she associates with 'Hyde has dreadfulitis'. To explain why speakers incorrectly think that (3) and (4) can differ in truth-value, some Russellians appeal to pragmatics. They say that, though (3) and (4) semantically express the same proposition, utterances of (3) and (4) pragmatically convey different propositions concerning BEL and different guises, and these pragmatically conveyed propositions concerning guises really do differ in truth value. I differ from these Russellians in that I doubt that speakers' judgments about (3) and (4) can always be explained by pragmatics (Braun 1998 (Braun , 2006b ). I think that speakers are rationally able to think that (3) can be true while (4) is false because they entertain the proposition that (3) and (4) express under two different guises, and so appeal to pragmatics is unnecessary. I also believe that a fuller pragmatic explanation of intuitions about (3) and (4) ultimately requires one to suppose that speakers grasp the proposition they express under two Schiffer (1978 Schiffer ( , 1987 , Crimmins and Perry (1989) , and Crimmins (1992) think that (roughly speaking) the semantic content of 'believe', in all contexts, is the ternary BEL relation. The proposition semantically expressed by a belief attribution, in a context, includes a guise as a constituent, though the attribution contains no expression that refers to it. Thus these relaxed Russellian theories are sometimes called hidden indexical theories. Mark Richard (1990) instead holds that 'believe' expresses different binary relations in different contexts, depending (roughly) on the thoughts that the attributer has about the believer's guises; Richard also holds that 'that'-clauses refer to amalgams of words and Russellian propositions. On both sorts of view, (3) and (4) really do differ in truth-value, in some contexts. Nevertheless, strict Russellians and relaxed Russellians agree that the rationality of belief depends heavily on guises.
I have now described typical Russellian responses to familiar objections from rational belief, rational belief change, speakers' judgments about truth-values, and speakers' use of belief attributions to explain behavior. There are, no doubt, substantive remaining issues concerning Russellian claims about guises and rational flat-out belief. Unfortunately, I cannot discuss these issues here. But I can now describe how Chalmers's Bayesian objections to referentialism and Russellianism parallel the preceding objections, and how Russellians can respond to Chalmers's objections in a parallel way.
Bayesianism, Russellianism, and rational partial belief
Bayesians seek more refined constraints on rationality than we have seen so far. They say that agents believe propositions to varying degrees between 0 and 1 (inclusive). They call this 'partial belief', and describe it using attributions such as 'John is highly confident that snow is white', 'Mary has a credence of .5 in the proposition that the coin came up heads', and 'Kim believes to degree .9 that Obama was the US President in February 2009'. Bayesians wish to state rational constraints on degree of belief, and revision in degree of belief.
The relation between flat-out belief and partial belief is complicated. For instance, according to Bayesians, an agent can partially believe a proposition without flat-out believing it.
Here is an obvious case: I do not believe that the lottery ticket that I just purchased will win. But
Bayesians say that I do partially believe that proposition to some degree less than .5, for instance, to degree .0001. To avoid confusion between flat-out belief and partial belief, I will introduce a new ternary attitude verb, d-believe, to discuss the latter. (The letter 'd' is meant to suggest 'degree'.) I will settle on the following form of English ascription:
Thus, I will use 'd-believe' in roughly the same way that others use 'partially believe'. For example, rather than say that Mary partially believes that the coin came up heads to degree .5, I
will say that Mary d-believes that the coin came up heads to degree .5.
In principle, a theorist of d-belief could hold that agents sometimes rationally d-believe a single proposition to more than one degree. However, Bayesians typically assume that this is not the case, at least ideally. Given this assumption (or idealization), Bayesians can reasonably assume that for every agent A, there is a function p A from propositions P to numbers n between 0 and 1 (inclusive) such that p A (P)=n iff A d-believes P to degree n. Often this function is called 'A's credence function'. According to typical Bayesians, rational agents' credence functions (ideally) satisfy the axioms of probability theory. That is, every rational agent's credence function maps every proposition to some number n such that n≥0; every such function maps every logically true proposition to 1; and if such a function maps P to m and Q to n, and P and Q are logically inconsistent, then it maps the proposition that P∨Q to m+n. From this it follows that if a credence function maps proposition P to n, then it maps the proposition not-P to 1-n. All of this can be translated back to statements about d-believing: For instance, for all propositions P, if
Bayesians typically use an agent's betting behavior (or dispositions to betting behavior)
as evidence for that agent's degrees of belief. For instance, suppose A is willing to risk a lot of money in a bet on proposition P, though A knows that she would win very little money if P were true. Then A's degree of belief in P is high. Agent A's degree of belief can be quantified using this betting behavior, given certain assumptions about the value that A attaches to money.
Bayesians also endorse principles about rational updating of degrees of belief. Suppose that at time t, A d-believes Q to a degree greater than 0 but less than 1, and suppose that at time t′ she changes her degree of belief in proposition Q to 1 as a result of learning, and suppose she learns nothing else. Then A must, at t′, change the degrees to which she d-believes many other propositions, if she is to remain rational. To describe the needed change, many Bayesians first define A's conditional probability function p A (P|Q) as follows: We join Olivia at noon on Monday. She has already examined Jekyll for the alpha gene, and discovered that he has it, and revised her credence function accordingly, to obtain p olivia . She knows that she will examine Hyde that afternoon. To figure out her credence function before she sees Hyde that afternoon, we present her with the sentences 'Jekyll has dreadfulitis', 'Jekyll has the beta gene', 'Jekyll has dreadfulitis and Jekyll has the beta gene', and 'Hyde has the beta gene'. Her betting behavior suggests the following.
p olivia (that Jekyll has dreadfulitis) = .1 p olivia (that Jekyll has dreadfulitis | that Jekyll has the beta gene) = .9 p olivia (that Hyde has the beta gene) = .01
In the afternoon, Olivia examines Hyde, and she now vigorously assents to 'Hyde has the beta gene'. She has revised her credence function again to obtain p′ olivia . We again present her with the previous sentences, and her betting behavior indicates the following. 
The d-BEL and Guise-Negation Principle
If A is a rational agent, and Guise(x, P, A) and d-BEL (A, P, n, x) , then d-BEL(A, not-P, 1-
n, Neg(x)).
This is an analog to our earlier principle regarding BELing propositions and their negations under guises. More generally, we can say that rational d-belief is determined by rational d-BELing, in the following way: A rationally d-believes P to degree n iff: x(Guise(x, P, A) & Rationally d-
BEL(A, P, n, x)).
If we think that Bayesianism is getting at something right when it says that rational agents conditionalize, then we can state a principle for revising the degrees to which an agent dBELs a proposition under a guise that amounts to conditionalization-under-guises.
d-BELing and Updating
Suppose that A is rational, and suppose that at time t, (i) We could also define a six-place relation  A conditionally-d-BELs P under x, on Q under y, to degree n  , in terms of unconditional d-BELing. 11 We could then restate the above update rule as follows. Suppose that A is rational, and at time t (i) A d-BELs Q, under guise y, to some degree greater than 0 and less than 1, and also (ii) A conditionally-d-BELs P under x, on Q under y, to degree n. Suppose that at t′, A comes to d-BEL Q to degree 1 under guise y as a result of learning, and suppose A learns nothing else. Then at t′, A begins to d-BEL P to degree n under guise x.
So far, I have not explicitly assumed that there is at most one degree n to which A d-BELs a proposition P under a guise x. But if we do assume this (which seems a reasonable idealization), then for each agent we can define a binary function p A on proposition-guise pairs such that: if Guise(x, P, A), then p A (P, x)=n iff d-BEL (A, P, n, x) . We can make the idealizing assumption that every rational agent's credence function, defined on propositions-guise pairs, conforms to the axioms of probability. 12 We can then define a four-place conditional-probability function for each agent, defined in terms of that agent's unconditional credence function, as
We can then say that 12 Some technical details follow. Let us start with an axiomatization for probability functions (taken from Hájek 2012) in which the domain of a probability function is a set S of sentences that are closed under countable truthfunctional combinations.
i. For all s ∈ S, p(s) ≥ 0. ii.
For all s ∈ S, if s is a logical truth (in classical logic), then p(s) = 1. iii.
For all s 1 ∈ S and s 2 ∈ S, if s 1 and s 2 are logically incompatible, then p(s 1 ∨ s 2 ) = p(s 1 ) + p(s 2 ).
With some appropriate definitions, Guise Russellians can say that an agent's credence function, and her set of proposition-guise pairs, satisfy the axioms of probability iff they satisfy the constraints on p and S given by the above axioms. They can do so because, as I mentioned above, guises are logically related to each other in much the way that sentences in truth-functional logic are. For instance, for any guise, there is exactly one guise-negation, and for any two guises (in a certain order), there is exactly one guise-disjunction. So, proposition-guise pairs can be treated model-theoretically like sentences of a classical language, and classical definitions of 'true in a model', 'logically true', and 'logically incompatible' can be given for them. Suppose that G A is the set of agent A's guises (that is, the set of guises x such that for some proposition P, Guise(x, P, A)), and suppose that G A is closed under guise-negation and guise-disjunction. (Negation and disjunction make up a truth-functionally complete set of connectives, so we can ignore all other operations on guises.) Let PG A be the set of all proposition-guise pairs <P, x> such that x∈G A and Guise(x, P, A). A model M for PG A is a function from PG A to truth-values that satisfies the following conditions: M assigns truth to <not-P, Neg(x)> iff M assigns falsehood to <P, x>, and M assigns truth to <P ∨ Q, Disj(x, y)> iff either M assigns truth to <P, x> or M assigns truth to <Q, y>. If <P, x>∈ PG A , then <P, x> is logically true iff for all models M of PG A , M assigns truth to <P, x>. <P, x> and <Q, y> are logically incompatible iff there is no model M that assigns truth to both. We can now say: If PG A is A's set of proposition-guise pairs, and p A is A's credence function, then p A satisfies the axioms of probability iff PG A and p A satisfy the axioms given above, when they are assigned to 'S' and 'p', respectively. This is equivalent to saying that (i′)-(iii′) are true.
i′. For all <P, x> ∈ PG A , p A (P, x) ≥ 0. ii′.
For all <P, x> ∈ PG A , if <P, x> is logically true, then p A (P, x) = 1. iii′.
For all <P, x> ∈ PG A and <Q, y> ∈ PG A , if <P, x> and <Q, y> are logically incompatible, then
rational agents change their degrees of belief, under guises, by conditionalization. 13 Let us call this view Guise-Russellian Bayesianism.
We can now see why Olivia's revisions in d-belief are consistent with her being rational.
Pretend, for simplicity, that Olivia's guises are English sentences. Her earlier credence function p A has the following features.
p olivia (that Jekyll has dreadfulitis, 'Jekyll has dreadfulitis') = .1 p olivia (that Jekyll has dreadfulitis, 'Jekyll has dreadfulitis' | that Jekyll has the beta gene, 'Jekyll has the beta gene') = .9.
She then examines Hyde and revises her credence function as follows.
p′ olivia (that Jekyll has the beta gene, 'Hyde has the beta gene') = 1
However, her degree of belief in the proposition that Jekyll has the beta gene is still low, when she considers it under the guise 'Jekyll has the beta gene'.
p′ olivia (that Jekyll has the beta gene, 'Jekyll has the beta gene') = .1 So, the revised Bayesian conditionalization principle does not require her to conditionalize, or to come to d-believe that Jekyll has dreadfulitis to .9. So, her behavior is consistent with her being rational.
Summarizing: Russellians use guises, and relations involving them, to state plausible principles of rational flat-out belief and rational flat-out belief revision. They can also use guises, and underlying relations involving them, to state plausible principles of rational d-belief and rational d-belief revision. These Russellian moves are just as plausible in the case of d-belief as they are in the case of flat-out belief. So, Bayesianism, degrees of belief, and rational d-belief do not raise substantially new issues for Guise Russellianism.
The objects of belief and the objects of credence
As I mentioned above, Chalmers early in his paper (pp. 588-89) gives an outline of an argument against referentialism about belief. If we recast it into an argument against the Russellian version of referentialism, we get something like the following.
(11a) The objects of credence are the objects of belief.
(11b) It is not the case that the objects of credence are Russellian propositions.
(11c) So, it is not the case that the objects of belief are Russellian propositions.
(11d) If Russellianism is true, then the objects of belief are Russellian propositions.
(11e) So, Russellianism is not true.
Let us assume that this argument is valid, and ask how a Guise Russellian should respond to it.
14 The argument uses the phrase 'objects of credence'. The correct Russellian response to the argument will depend heavily on how this phrase is understood. One reasonable way to understand it is by analogy with the phrase 'objects of belief': Just as the objects of belief are the things towards which agents bear the belief relation, so the objects of credence are the things towards which agents bear relations of partial belief, degrees of belief, degrees of confidence, and credence relations. But Russellians, like everyone else, should hold that the things to which agents bear credence relations are propositions. Suppose, for example, that Olivia partially believes, to degree .1, that Jekyll has the beta gene. Then she stands in the relation of partial belief, to degree .1, to the proposition that Jekyll has the beta gene. Generalizing, we can conclude that propositions are the things to which agents bear credence relations. Furthermore, agents can flat-out believe and assert the things to which they bear degrees of belief; but if that's so, then the things to which agents bear degrees of belief relations are propositions. For example, suppose that Olivia not only partially believes to degree .95 that Jekyll is English, but also flatout believes that Jekyll is English. Suppose she (consequently) asserts that Jekyll is English.
Then there is something that she (simultaneously) partially believes to degree .95, and flat-out believes, and asserts. But the thing that she flat-out believes and asserts is a proposition.
Therefore, the thing that she partially believes to degree .95 is a proposition. But Russellians hold that propositions are Russellian (obviously). Thus, Russellians should hold that agents bear credence relations to Russellian propositions. So, they should deny line (11b), when 'objects of credence' is understood to refer to the things to which agents bear credence relations.
Chalmers, however, usually understands the phrase 'objects of credence' differently. He takes the objects of credence to be the things in the domains of credence functions. 15 Russellians 15 Chalmers (p. 590) says 'I take it as a stipulation about 'object of credence' that objects of credence are those objects in which individuals have credence; that is, they are the objects that an individual's credence function at a time maps to credences, for the purpose of a successful theory of credence.' The first sentence (before the semicolon) suggests (to me) the view that the objects of credence are those things to which agents bear credence relations, such as partial belief. The second sentence, however, clearly takes objects of credence to be the things in the domain of a credence function. Using the term 'object of credence' in this latter way may seem odd, for we do not ordinarily say that the things in the domain of a function are its objects: we do not, for instance, say that the objects of the squaring function are numbers. But using the phrase in this way would not be odd for someone who assumes that the things to which agents stand in credence relations are the same as the things in the domains of their hold that the things in the domains of agents' credence functions are proposition-guise pairs. But proposition-guise pairs are not the things that agents believe, and so are not the objects of belief, according to Russellians. So, when the phrase 'object of credence' is understood in Chalmers's way, Russellians should deny line (11a).
Chalmers claims that Russellians' denial of (11a), when 'objects of credence' is understood in his way, 'puts some pressure' on referentialism about belief, including Russellianism (p. 611). Perhaps it does put some pressure on Russellianism, but if so, that pressure is no different from the pressure put on Russellians by their typical claims about guises and rational flat-out belief. As I said above, Guise Russellians hold that an agent's rationally flatout believing a proposition depends heavily on the guises under which she believes it. So, Guise
Russellians should also hold that the rationality of an agent's partially believing (d-believing) a proposition also depends heavily on the guises under which she partially believes (d-believes) it.
But credence functions should be defined in such a way that they are useful for stating constraints on rational partial belief. Consequently, Guise Russellians should hold that the things in the domain of an agent's credence function are proposition-guise pairs. Moreover, if the Russellian use of guises succeeds in the case of flat-out belief, then it succeeds in the case of partial belief and credence functions; and if it fails in the case of flat-out belief, then it also fails in the case of partial belief and credence functions. So, the Russellian denial of line (11a), when 'object of credence' is understood as Chalmers prefers, does not raise substantially new issues for Russellianism.
credence functions. Chalmers usually assumes that they are the same. Guise Russellians, however, claim that they are different. Chalmers's correctly takes his Olivia example to support the conclusion that the things in the domains of rational credence functions are not Russellian propositions. So, his example supports (11b), when 'object of credence' is construed in Chalmers's way. But Olivia provides no support for the conclusion that it is not the case that the things to which agents stand in credence relations are Russellian propositions, unless one assumes (contrary to the Russellians) that these objects are the same as the objects in the domains of rational agents' credence functions.
Chalmers's criticisms of Guise Russellianism
Chalmers (pp. 600-01, 609-11) discusses the preceding use of guises by referentialists. 16 He concedes that referentialists can use guises to state plausible principles of rational degree of belief and belief change, and that they can take the objects in the domains of credence functions to be propositions-guise pairs (p. 601, first full paragraph). But he criticizes this sort of guisereferentialism in the following passage.
The resulting referentialist position is somewhat uncomfortable, as one can apply the arguments given earlier to credence ascriptions such as 'Olivia has low confidence that Jekyll is Hyde is low' [sic-DB] and so on. Perhaps the referentialist will give some special treatment of such sentences, as they do for belief sentences. For example, they might argue that such a sentence expresses the false proposition that p(JH) is low, while conveying the true proposition that p(JH*) is low. Alternatively, they might hold that it makes tacit reference to a contextually specified guise, saying correctly that p(G 1 , JH) is low. [Footnote 8, omitted here-DB] Presumably they will say the same for many or most other subjective probability claims involving names. The first option requires denying the truth of claims that play a highly successful and systematic explanatory role, while the second option requires significant complexity. These outcomes are not foreign to the referentialist, but I think they give reason to take seriously a view on which the referents of 'that'-clauses are non-referential too. 17 I have in mind Chalmers's claims about referentialists' views of (i) and (ii).
i. Olivia has low confidence that Jekyll is Hyde. ii.
p(JH) is low.
Chalmers suggests that referentialists would say that (i) is false. But if we extend a strict Russellian view of belief attributions to ordinary confidence attributions such as (i), then we get the result that (i) is true, for Olivia has low confidence in the proposition that Jekyll is Hyde under her 'Jekyll is Hyde' guise. This is, of course, compatible with her also having high confidence in that proposition under her 'Jekyll is Jekyll' guise, and so compatible with the truth of 'Olivia has high confidence that Jekyll is Hyde', according to strict Russellians. (Possible-worlds referentialists would also say that (i) is true.) Relaxed Russellians could hold that (i) is true in some contexts and false in others. Chalmers suggests that guise-referentialists would hold that (i) and (ii) express the same proposition. Perhaps some possible-worlds theorists would, but no guise Russellian would, for (i) and (ii) differ too much in grammatical structure. Chalmers suggests that guise-referentialists could hold that (ii) is false and 'p(JH*) is low' is true, where JH* is a surrogate for JH. However, strict Russellians might say that the functor 'p' fails to have a semantic content, if a Bayesian introduces it while falsely assuming that Olivia has a single credence function defined on propositions. If 'p' lacks content, then either (a) both 'p(JH)' and 'p(JH*)' are false or (b) both are truthvalue-less. Since some relaxed Russellians differ with strict Russellians on the semantics of 'that Jekyll is Hyde', some may differ with strict Russellians on whether Bayesians can successfully introduce the preceding functor 'p'. 
Chalmers's theory of the objects of belief and credence
Though Chalmers argues against referentialism (and Russellianism) for the objects of belief and credence, his own theory of these objects is surprisingly similar in structure to Guise Russellianism. Chalmers initially argues (pp. 618-28) 
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None the less, Chalmers seemingly believes that his theory is superior to the Russellians'.
But his theory is superior only if structured primary intensions can play the above-described role.
I will argue that there are good reasons to doubt that they can. I will also argue that there are no comparably serious reasons to doubt that Russellian guises can.
Let us begin with Russellian guises. As I said earlier, some Russellians remain neutral about their nature. But Russellians who say more about them usually take them to be mental representations with sentence-like constituent structures. On such a view, x is a guise of proposition P for agent A iff two conditions hold. First, A bears the right sort of psychological relation to x: for instance, x has the right sort of functional or cognitive role for A. Second, the content of x for A is P. (On this view, guises are not contents, but rather bearers of contents.) The content of x for A is P only if x has constituents which are also guises for A, and the contents of those guise-constituents for A are the constituents of P. For instance, if x is a guise, for A, of the proposition that Jekyll/Hyde has dreadfulitis, then x has a guise-constituent whose content for A is Jekyll/Hyde and also a guise-constituent whose content for A is the property of having dreadfulitis. Those constituents of x have those contents for A because they bear the right sorts of causal/historical relations to Jekyll/Hyde and instances of the disease. Agent A believes, or partially believes to a certain degree, the propositional content of guise x iff A stands in the right sort of cognitive relation to x (in addition to standing in the cognitive relation to x required for x to be a guise for A). The degrees to which A d-believes propositions, under guises, determine how she is disposed to bet on sentences, such as 'Jekyll has dreadfulitis' and 'Hyde has 18 Structured primary intensions also play the same role in Chalmers's semantic theory of belief attributions that guises do in relaxed Russellian semantic theories. But I will not be discussing the semantics of belief attributions below.
dreadfulitis'. Agent A may be disposed to bet on these sentences differently, because she entertains the proposition that Jekyll/Hyde has dreadfulitis under two different guises when she hears those sentences, and she d-believes that proposition to different degrees under those two guises.
That is a typical Russellian view about guises. Russellians who hold it engage in some psychological speculation. But it is reasonably plausible speculation-as plausible as much speculation about mental representation in contemporary cognitive science. And it is mild compared to Chalmers's speculations about primary intensions, which I describe below.
Chalmers wants the domains of credence functions to be contents, meanings, or sets of possibilities of some sort (but not typical Russellian guises, for these are not contents). He wants this because he wants to associate sets of possibilities with sentences in idiolects, and he wants such sets because he thinks it 'is required in order to use the full explanatory apparatus of the probabilist in the analysis of credences ' (p. 612) . 19 Chalmers moreover wants to associate different contents and sets with the sentences 'Jekyll is Jekyll' and 'Jekyll is Hyde' in Olivia's idiolect, since she bets on these differently. But the sets of metaphysically possible worlds at which these sentences are true are the same, so he cannot use these sets to assign them different contents. Instead, Chalmers associates primary intensions with sentences in Olivia's idiolect.
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Primary intensions of sentences are functions from epistemic scenarios to truth values. Chalmers 19 Chalmers says nothing further about the 'full explanatory apparatus', but it presumably involves the use of settheory and algebra. Chalmers goes on to say 'This requirement does not require that the objects be sets of possibilities. . . But they must determine such a set, and we must be able to associate credences with such sets' (p. 612). However, Chalmers later suggests (p. 629) that the credence functions of non-ideal agents operate on enriched propositions, which are not sets of possibilities. He also says that two enriched propositions may be associated with two different credences, and yet determine the same set of possibilities. So moving to enriched propositions would force Chalmers to abandon the apparatus that exploits sets, and would also force him to give up associating an agent's credences with sets of possibilities. 20 More accurately, he associates primary intensions with assertions (acts of asserting), so as to avoid difficulties raised by context-sensitive sentences (p. 593). We can ignore this refinement here, because we will not be discussing context-sensitive sentences.
usually takes epistemic scenarios to be metaphysically possible centered worlds, which we can model with triples consisting of a metaphysically possible world w, an individual that exists at w, and a time in w (p. 615). Chalmers thinks that certain facts about Olivia determine the primary intension that 'Jekyll is Hyde' has in her idiolect. However, his views about the facts that determine the primary intension, and how they do so, are not entirely settled, so his discussion leaves open various options. I describe his main line of thought below.
Chalmers (usually) says that the primary intension associated with 'Jekyll is Hyde' in Olivia's idiolect is determined by how she would bet, under certain conditions, on certain complex sentences used to make conditional bets. Suppose that S(w) is a complete description in Olivia's idiolect of a centered world w. Suppose we asked her to consider, and bet on, the sentence 'Jekyll is Hyde, given that S(w)'. Suppose we make sure that she understands that this is a conditional bet (a bet that is off if S(w) is false: see p. 620). Chalmers stipulates (p. 620) that if she were to take such a bet to be a 'sure thing' (to have a probability of 1) then the primary intension associated with 'Jekyll is Hyde' in her idiolect yields truth when applied to w (and conversely). The conditional bets she would make, under certain conditions, on all sentences of the form 'Jekyll is Hyde, given S(w)', for all scenarios w, determine the primary intension of 'Jekyll is Hyde' in her idiolect. including, for instance, the non-natural kind terms 'pail' and 'bucket', all names of the name 'Jekyll', and the terms 'cause', 'intend', 'believe', 'sensation', 'red', and 'π'. Therefore, it is likely that for all worlds w, S(w) contains an extremely sparse vocabulary, and so Olivia would be unsure whether 'Jekyll is Hyde' is true in w when w is described with S(w) (even if she were given unlimited memory, unlimited time to reason, and so on, as required by Chalmer's conditions of ideal reflection, and assuming that there is some fact of the matter about what judgment she would make in such conditions-more about this below). So, for (nearly) all w, if she assigned any probability to a sentence of the form 'Jekyll is Hyde, given that S(w)' in Chalmers's ideal conditions, she would assign it a probability close to .5, reflecting her agnosticism. Therefore, if we followed Chalmers's method for assigning primary intensions to sentences in her idiolect, the primary intension of 'Jekyll is Hyde' would be falsehood at all scenarios. The same would happen with 'Twain is Clemens', 'Barack Obama is George W.
Bush', and many other sentences in her language: they would have the same (trivial) primary intension. But since Olivia (in fact) assigns different probabilities to different sentences of this type, primary intensions cannot play the guise-like role (described at the beginning of this section) that Chalmers wants them to play.
Even waiving this concern about the vocabulary in S(w), we should have worries about
Chalmers's ideal conditions for making conditional bets. Chalmers assumes that (nearly always)
there is a determinate fact of the matter about which bets Olivia would make on complex conditional sentences under Chalmers's conditions of ideal rational reflection, in which she has new vocabulary, and contingent limits on her memory and reasoning ability are removed, and she can engage in arbitrarily long and complex a priori reasoning. In particular, he seemingly thinks that for nearly all scenarios w, there is exactly one degree n such that, if Olivia were to consider 'Jekyll is Hyde, given that S(w)' under his ideal conditions, she would assign that sentence degree n, and make conditional bets accordingly. But is there exactly one such n?
Removing contingent limits on Olivia's memory and reasoning abilities may not enable her to engage in arbitrarily long and complex a priori reasoning, for it may be metaphysically impossible for her to have that ability. If so, then there is no single degree n such that, if (per impossibile) she were able to engage in arbitrarily long a priori reasoning and she considered 'Jekyll is Hyde, given that S(w)', she would assign n to that sentence. 23 Even supposing it is metaphysically possible for her to have unlimited memory and to engage in arbitrarily long a priori reasoning, she would have to be drastically different from how she actually is to have these abilities. If so, there may be no actual fact about her that determines the following: there is a single n such that if she were to consider 'Jekyll is Hyde, given that S(w)', and she were as drastically different from how she actually is as Chalmers proposes, then she would assign the sentence a probability of n. Rather, if she were so drastically different, she might assign the sentence a probability of n, but she might equally well assign it a substantially different probability m. (Compare: There is no actual fact about Verdi and Bizet which determines the following: there is a nationality such that if Verdi and Bizet were compatriots, then they would both have that nationality. Rather, if they were compatriots, they might both be French, but they 23 Standard theories of counterfactuals say that all counterfactuals with metaphysically impossible antecedents are vacuously true. If these theories are correct, and it is metaphysically impossible for Olivia to satisfy Chalmers's ideal conditions, then every counterfactual of the following form is true, for all values of 'n':  If Olivia were to bet on 'Jekyll is Hyde, given that S(w)' under conditions in which she can perform arbitrary amounts of a priori reasoning, her betting behavior would indicate that she thinks it has probability n  .
might equally well be Italian instead.) If this is right, then Chalmers's method does not determinately assign a single primary intension to 'Jekyll is Hyde' in her idiolect.
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I have been discussing Chalmers's theory of primary intensions. His ultimate theory of the objects of belief and credence uses structured primary intensions. The structured primary intension associated with a sentence, in an idiolect, is a structured entity whose constituents are the primary intensions associated with the words in the sentence. But if we have any doubts about primary intensions, then we should have at least equally strong doubts about structured primary intensions.
You might have worries about Russellian psychology and Russellian guises, and so have worries about Russellian credence functions defined on proposition-guise pairs. But your worries about guises should be mild compared to your worries about primary intensions and credence functions defined on enriched propositions.
Conclusions
Let us review. There are familiar objections to Russellianism about (flat-out) belief that appeal to certain principles of rational belief, such as the Modus Ponens Principle. Russellians have replied to those objections by denying the principles of rational belief on which they rely, and replacing those principles with analogous ones that use guises and relations among agents, propositions, and guises. Chalmers has presented parallel objections to Russellian theories of partial belief; these objections appeal to certain Bayesian principles of rational change in partial belief. There is an entirely parallel Russellian reply that denies those principles, and replaces them with analogous ones that use guises and relations among agents, propositions, guises, and numbers.
The Russellian replies to Chalmers's Bayesian objections are just as plausible as the Russellian 24 Chalmers and Jackson (2001) and argue for determinacy. I cannot address their arguments here.
replies to the earlier objections concerning rational flat-out belief. So, Chalmers's Bayesian objections do not raise substantially new problems for Guise Russellians.
Chalmers's own theory of the objects of belief and credence is structurally similar to the Guise Russellian's theory, for structured primary intensions play the same role in Chalmers's theory that guises do in the Russellian's theory. But Chalmers's theory of (structured) primary intensions is speculative and dubious. There are no comparably serious problems with typical Russellian theories of guises. 25 
